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Abstract
Purpose: Policy misalignment across different sectors of government serves
as one of the pivotal barriers to WHO Framework convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) implementation. This paper examines the logic used by
government officials to justify providing investment incentives to increase
tobacco processing and manufacturing in the context of FCTC implementation
in Zambia.
Methods: We conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with key
informants from government, civil society and intergovernmental economic
organizations (n=23). We supplemented the interview data with an analysis
of public documents pertaining to economic development policy in Zambia.
Results: We found gross misalignments between the policies of the economic
sector and efforts to implement the provisions of the FCTC. Our interviews
uncovered the rationale used by officials in the economic sector to justify
providing economic incentives to bolster tobacco processing and
manufacturing in Zambia: 1) tobacco is not consumed by Zambians/tobacco
is an export commodity, 2) economic benefits outweigh health costs, and 3)
tobacco consumption is a personal choice.
Conclusions: Much of the struggle Zambia has experienced implementing
the FCTC can be attributed to misalignments between the economic and
health sectors. Zambia’s development agenda seeks to bolster agricultural
processing and manufacturing. Tobacco control proponents must understand
and work within this context of economic development in order to foster
productive strategies with those working on tobacco supply issues. These
findings are broadly applicable to the global analysis on the barriers and
facilitators of FCTC implementation. It is important that the Ministry of Health
monitors the tobacco policy of other sectors and engages with these sectors
to find ways of harmonizing FCTC implementation across sectors.
Keywords: Economic Policy, Public Policy, Economic Development,
Investment Incentives

Introduction
Tobacco control initiatives require coordinated interventions
across all sectors of government. The WHO Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) implementation requires coordination among
government sectors dealing with health, agriculture, trade, industry
and finance among others. This requirement is reflected in Article 5.1
of the Treaty: “Each Party shall develop, implement, periodically
update and review comprehensive multisectoral national tobacco
control …”.1 One of the pressing challenges of FCTC implementation is
the struggle to enlist the support of the non-health sectors of
government who are either disengaged from the issue of tobacco
control or actively pursue policies that are misaligned with the
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provisions of the FCTC.2 Despite this need, whole-of-government
approaches (WoG) to tobacco control have yet to find their place as
the modus operandi of most governments.3,4 The challenge of WoG is
particularly salient in the implementation of the FCTC.
The FCTC is the first public health treaty to be negotiated and
ratified under the auspices of the WHO and outlines measures to be
implemented by parties to the Convention that serve to reduce the
demand for and supply of tobacco.1 To date 180 countries are party to
the Treaty (as of April 2015). Zambia ratified the FCTC in 2008. Since
this time, the Ministry of Health, through the Tobacco Control Focal
Point, has worked to implement policies and to establish legislation
that aligns with the treaty’s commitments and provisions. Post-FCTC
legislation was drafted in 2010 but as of April 2015 has not yet been
adopted into law.5 The challenges of implementation are not unique to
Zambia and our multi-country research is uncovering common barriers
to implementation among tobacco-growing countries with emerging
economies.6 One of these barriers relates to incentives to attract
domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI). The general logic
underlying government investment incentives is twofold.7 First,
incentives are provided to stimulate economic growth or create value
for the country by attracting capital, regardless of its origin, foreign or
domestic.8 Second, incentives are a means of attracting investment to
a country in a competitive global market place,9 intended to induce
investment that otherwise would not be made.
For Zambia, the pursuit of investment has become central to the
political economy of the country’s future development. Despite
consistent economic growth over the past decade, Zambia continues to
struggle with high levels of poverty, income inequality and, in 2012,
was ranked 163 of 187 countries on the Human Development Index.10
Zambia’s economy relies heavily on mineral exports, notably copper.
However, since 2002 Zambia has focused on diversifying its economy
by supporting the agricultural and service sectors. According to a
report by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) the “challenge (for Zambia) is to attract more
investments in sectors other than mining”.11 The former president of
Zambia, Michael Sata, noted “the aim of (his) government is to
continue with policy and institutional reforms with the key objective of
making the country more attractive to domestic and foreign private
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investment”.12 FDI has increased significantly from $72 million (USD)
in 2001 to $1.7 billion in 2012.13 Much of the FDI inflows are tied to
the copper sector. The mining sector in general continues to be the
largest attractor of FDI (approximately 70% of total investment
pledges in 2008).11 Although agriculture only accounted for 22% of
GDP in 2011 it is important for the livelihoods of the majority of
Zambians, accounting for approximately 67% of employment and “has
likewise been attracting FDI particularly in the areas of production of
horticultural and floricultural products, as well as fruits, cotton, maize,
tobacco and sugar”.11 It is this context of government-supported
economic diversification and development that tobacco production,
processing and manufacturing are being encouraged through
investment incentives, representing a discrepancy between economic
goals, and tobacco control commitments. This paper focuses on how
these two dissonant goals are rationalized by different actors.

Methods
The findings presented in this paper are a result of a larger
multi-country study in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. This multi-country
case study examines the political economy of tobacco control. The
case study methodology is oriented towards using multiple methods to
understand a complex phenomenon within a particular context.14,15
The findings presented in this paper refer only to our research in
Zambia. The findings are derived from data collected through semistructured interviews with representatives from the Department of
Industry (n=3), Foreign Affairs (n=2), Foreign Trade (n=2),
Agriculture and Agribusiness (n=5), World Health Organization country
office (n=1), Ministry of Health (n=2), Tobacco Board of Zambia
(n=1), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
headquarters (n=1), health-based civil society organizations (n=3)
and tobacco industry representatives (n=3). The key informants were
identified using purposive sampling and were included because of their
involvement in our area of interest, namely the political economy of
tobacco and tobacco control. All interviews were conducted in the
workplace of the informants by international and Zambian researchers
associated with the study. All but two of the interviewees agreed to be
recorded. Notes were taken during the interviews with these two
participants. Interview length ranged between 10 and 60 minutes with
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the majority of interviews at approximately 45 minutes. We
supplemented the interview data with public documents on Zambia’s
economic development plans and tobacco investment. Key informants
pointed our research team to the key strategic documents from the
Zambian Development Agency that informed their work. In addition to
documents identified by key informants we collected other public
documents pertaining to Zambia’s development agenda, such as
reports produced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. The study protocol received ethics approval by the
Institutional Review Boards of McGill University, Morehouse University
(American Cancer Society) and the University of Zambia. All interviews
were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using thematic analysis.16 The
transcripts were entered into NVivo qualitative software for data
management. The qualitative analysis was conducted by the lead
author and used both deductive coding (based on the interview
questions) as well as inductive coding. The results were discussed with
team members, two of whom were experienced Zambian researchers
active in the health and tobacco area, for verification.

Results
One of the major initiatives of the Zambian government to
attract investment was the creation of the Zambia Development
Agency (ZDA) in 2006, with the mandate to “foster economic growth
and development by promoting trade and investment in Zambia
through an efficient, effective and coordinated private sector led
economic development strategy”.17 Tobacco export promotion is one of
the country’s priorities, now absorbed within the work of the ZDA,
justified primarily by its importance to farmers:
…It is a key industry especially for the farmers … We have more
than twenty thousand small scale farmers growing tobacco at
the moment meaning that each farmer is able to take care of
about six members of the family and when we do the math we
will actually see how important this sector is in this country and
how critical this industry is in reducing poverty levels. (ZDA
informant)
Tobacco production receives incentives in terms of machinery
and agrichemical imports, on which “duty and VAT are not paid.” The
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key informant from ZDA was not aware of the FCTC, and
acknowledged that ZDA does get involved in trade and tobacco
disputes in “bilateral and multilateral discussions … in
Geneva…articulating our interests.”
The ZDA is also responsible for the governance of Multi-Facility
Economic Zones (MFEZ) and Industrial Parks that were established in
2005 with investors from Japan and China. The MFEZs (special
industrial zones to both export-oriented and domestic-oriented
industries) were established to “create a platform for Zambia to
achieve economic development by attracting significant domestic and
foreign direct investment (FDI) through a strengthened policy and
legislative environment,” and are characterized by “the best features
of free trade zones (FTZs), export processing zones (EPZs) and the
industrial parks/zones concept”.18 In addition to bolstering governance
and infrastructure to create an attractive investment environment, the
ZDA provides a list of investment incentives offered to investors who
intend to establish operations in the MFEZs or whose investment aligns
with Zambia’s development priority sectors. There are seven MFEZ
priority sectors and twelve general priority sectors including agroprocessing and manufacturing of agricultural products, including
tobacco. The principal requirement to receive an investment incentive
from the ZDA is outlined in article 56: “An investor investing not less
than five hundred thousand United States Dollars or the equivalent in
convertible currency, in a priority sector or product, is entitled to
incentives as specified by or under the Income Tax Act or Customs and
Excise Act”.17 The priority given to agro-processing and manufacturing
is supported by the objective to establish value addition within
Zambia.19 including efforts “to increase tobacco processing for more
value-added”.11
This objective of value-addition is currently being enacted
through government support for the establishment of a tobacco
processing and manufacturing plant in the Makeni Industrial Park (an
MFEZ) in Lusaka by Roland Imperial Tobacco Company (RITCO), a
Zambian company.20–22 At present the plant is intended simply to
process tobacco leaf. But, a senior staff person with the MFEZ noted,
“in the long run [the company has] indicated it is in phases, in phase
one they are processing and laying the ground work, and then when
they get to phase three, that is when they begin to manufacturing the
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finished product [cigarettes].” In a public pronouncement, the CEO of
RITCO claimed “we invested more than USD $8 million in our new
cigarette plant in Lusaka, which can produce two billion cigarettes per
year, or around twice the cigarettes sold in Zambia annually”.22 This
amount far exceeds the USD $500,000 minimum investment that is
required to qualify for the incentives outlined by the ZDA.17,19,23
Whether restricted to leaf processing only, or proceeding to
finished product (not all Zambian informants thought this would be
likely), the company would benefit from government support in the
form of no tariffs or VAT on imported machinery or raw goods. As well,
“the government is funding this [MFEZ] … they had to put up a
requisite structure [electricity, roads, water] to make sure that the
place is conducive for our investors both local and foreign” (MFEZ
informant). It would also be exempt from any tax on profits for the
first 5 years, paying only fifty percent of the standard corporate rate
for the next three and seventy-five percent for the following two years.
Only after 10 years would profits be taxed at Zambia’s normal
corporate rate. These benefits would apply to tobacco, as to any other
agro-industry product that comprise one of ZDA’s priority investment
areas, and to processed leaf or finished products regardless of whether
they are meant for the domestic or export market. That these
incentives could give an unfair advantage over other Zambian tobacco
leaf processors or a manufacturer (one of our informants stated that
another manufacturing plant was getting established outside of an
MFEZ) “has not yet been discussed, because the primary objective of
these zones is to promote investment” (MFEZ informant).
“We are working knowing we have been told [by ZDA] to win
investors…we are being pushed that we need investors [yet] I
know that it has been the objective of the government to
regulate [tobacco] consumption…so you may say that if they are
doing that then are contradicting that…We market [investment]
on the marketing point of view not on the health point of
view…If we say we look at the health point then we would be
negative for us [and] we have to show the positive side” (MFEZ
informant).
Our interviews with representatives from Zambia’s Department’s
of Industry (DoI) and Foreign Trade (DoFT) similarly found that these
departments were also actively encouraging tobacco companies to set
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up processing and manufacturing facilities in Zambia. The participants
explicitly stated that they encouraged the provision of investment
incentives to make this happen, for both the domestic and
international market Both department representatives viewed tobacco
manufacturing as a potential growth area for Zambia’s economic
development objectives. This encouragement was situated in the
development strategy targeting value addition (namely manufacturing
of agricultural products grown in Zambia) within the economy: “the
agricultural sector will continue to be a strategic area of focus in
promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and creating
employment”.24 Since the closing of the British American Tobacco
manufacturing plant in Lusaka in 2006,25 all of the cured tobacco was
being exported for manufacturing in other countries.
When asked about the role of the FCTC in the policies of their
respective departments (i.e. DoI and DoFT), the participants only had
a vague understanding of its provisions or what commitments Zambia
had made to implementation. A high-level key informant from the
DoFT was unsure whether the treaty was in force in Zambia and noted
“implementation hasn’t started yet”. This statement may have been in
reference to stalled comprehensive tobacco control legislation,
although the treaty had come into force in Zambia in August 2008. It
is difficult to identify whether there is a true lack of understanding of
the FCTC and its relation to the economic policies of the country by
these informants, or whether their government departments are
intentionally acting contrary to its provisions. Our sense from the
interviews was that the FCTC was simply not considered to be relevant
to the work of either the DoI or the DoFT, and was situated as a
singular Department of Health initiative. When we asked the
participants about the relationship between investment incentives for
tobacco processing and manufacturing and the health aspects of
tobacco consumption, one participant stated that: “It is our view that
the benefits to the economy will outweigh the health costs” (DoI
informant).
Another participant, making the same argument as the
interviewee from the MFEZ, noted “our concern is to promote industrial
development and because smoking was a personal decision we are not
concerned with the health aspects” (DoI).
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The view that Zambia’s tobacco production, and even its
potential future cigarette manufacturing, would not add to its domestic
smoking rates was echoed by tobacco industry informants, one of
whom was quite explicit:
“There is this myth that the more tobacco we grow here the
more smokers we will have. We do not grow tobacco for local
consumption but rather for the growing market like China. There
is no correlation with the level of growing tobacco in Zambia to
the level of smoking. It doesn’t exist. In fact there is a reduction
in smoking in Zambia (tobacco industry informant).”
The most recent WHO tobacco report on Zambia, however,
estimates that in 2012 24% of males were current cigarette smokers,
22% of them daily, an increase of 2 and 5 percentiles respectively
over the previous year.26 Female rates remain considerably lower, but
are rising amongst adolescents.27 When asked that, even assuming
Zambian tobacco was strictly for export, it still meant someone else
will be consuming a hazardous product, the response was swift, “even
if we do not grow tobacco in Zambia, somebody else will grow it [and
export it] so you see what I mean, it will still be there.” The Tobacco
Association of Zambia (TAZ), representing farmers, noted that “the
harmful effects on the human being is not debatable, it has been
proven, we have all seen it” but that “it all borders on educating the
person, that you have a choice in life and should manage your life
accordingly” (TAZ informant).
These qualitative findings provide important insights into the
rationale used by members of the government’s economic sector when
developing policy pertaining to tobacco, which often resembles the
arguments of Zambia’s tobacco industry and farming representatives;
and suggests that there is deep misalignment between FCTC
commitments and efforts to implement the treaty across relevant
sectors of government. The tension this creates was best captured in
the somewhat wistful comment made by our MFEZ informant near the
end of the interview: “I think somehow there must be harmonization
of government policy; then that will make it much easier for
stakeholders.”
One of the salient conditions underlying policy misalignment and
lack of harmonization is that tobacco control is under-resourced. There
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will need to be great effort to strengthen the system of
implementation within countries like Zambia. One individual serves as
the FCTC focal point but is responsible for a diverse portfolio of
responsibilities beyond tobacco control. Along with other African
countries at the FCTC Conference of Parties meetings, Zambia has
complained about the lack of resources to implement tobacco control.
A senior policy worker in the Ministry of Health thought that one
reason why the comprehensive tobacco control legislation has been
stuck for four years is that “We had the challenge of funding, because
initially tobacco was not on our agenda and … we [had] different
budget lines…[and] it gives us a gap because we don’t have funds to
use for that purpose”. There is no multisectoral body in Zambia
charged with FCTC implementation and the different sectors “are not
coordinating properly” (Ministry of Health informant). Departments of
Industry, Foreign Trade and Agriculture noted that they did not work
with the Ministry of Health around issues of tobacco and tobacco
control. There is, however, an active, but small, group of civil society
organizations and individuals within government working in tobacco
control, but it must contend with a politically active and highlyresourced tobacco industry whose own interests in ‘coordinating’ is
about:
“…sitting together. You see look we agree on most of the things
but because we do not sit together we assume that we don’t
agree. We need to sit together as an industry…The problem in
this country is that we do not have an apex, one organization
where all players meet for cross cutting issues” (tobacco
industry informant).

Discussion
Our findings on the Zambia’s tobacco investment incentives
point to an urgent need for proponents of the FCTC (domestic and
international) to engage with the ZDA, DoI and DoFT to generate
economic policies that align with FCTC commitments. The question is
how to do this?
The Zambian government, like many governments around the
world, is fragmented when it comes to governing tobacco and tobacco
control. This fragmentation exists not only internally but also at
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different levels whereby the DoI, DoFT and ZDA are linked with
different economic development agencies within the United Nations
system and the Department of Health is operating with relationships to
the WHO and the Framework Convention Secretariat. Fragmentation is
a not a new phenomenon and undergirds calls made within the United
Nations System to “strengthen multisectoral and inter-agency
responses for the full implementation of the WHO FCTC”.28 To label the
lack of communication, coordination and cooperation between sectors
as fragmentation is only theoretically valid if there is underlying need
to act collectively. In the case of FCTC implementation, fragmentation
exists because comprehensive tobacco control implementation
(invoking all components of the treaty including supply and demand
measures) requires interventions in different sectors and levels of
government. In this sense, FCTC implementation poses a collective
action problem that challenges institutional designs that create
departmental silos with minimal interaction and strong jurisdictional
boundaries between sectors. In fact, the integrity of traditional
departmental jurisdiction is reflected in the authority to “operate
within a spatial and functional realm”.29 A logical starting point to
facilitate intersectoral working is to establish a forum for dialogue. The
forum itself is not a panacea but rather an initial point of contact.
Brazil presents a good example of how a high-level decision from the
President created a forum (CONICQ – i.e. the intersectoral
coordinating mechanism for the implementation of the FCTC) that
brought together 13 different ministries and departments to work on
FCTC implementation.30,31 It will likely require a high-level decision to
create such a forum in Zambia. Another basic starting point for those
working on FCTC implementation in countries like Zambia is to begin
to establish and propagate norms embedded in the FCTC. In this case
it will be the responsibility of proponents of tobacco control to
reinforce the binding legal nature of commitments made to the FCTC
to other sectors of government. The guidelines for Article 5.3 explicitly
state, “Parties should not grant incentives, privileges or benefits to the
tobacco industry to establish or run their business” (Article 5.3
guidelines, p. 8), which evidence from this research suggests they are
presently violating in Zambia.
It is possible that the first reaction to our findings might be that
the tobacco industry has coopted FCTC implementation by “capturing”
the economic sector. Regulatory capture, “specifically the process
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through which regulated (companies) end up manipulating state
agencies that are supposed to control them”,32 is a common
occurrence in tobacco politics.33–35 We suggest that although this may
be, and likely is, part of the scenario in Zambia, there are other
contextual factors that create a pull towards providing investment
incentives for tobacco manufacturing. Zambia is a tobacco producer
and exporter. The priority for the country is to diversify its economic
outputs while supporting value-addition in its processing and
manufacturing within the country. In this context tobacco is a logical
target for value-addition (leaf processing and manufacturing) given
that the supply-chain is well established. This is not to say that the
provision of investment incentives is good practice; in fact, we suggest
the opposite. Understanding this context will allow tobacco control
proponents to target the underlying logic used by government officials
who are promoting tobacco production, while also developing an
empathetic stance when working to develop collaborative relationships
with other government sectors. Understanding this context provides
the basis for remedying this policy misalignment from the perspective
of FCTC implementation. There are numerous interventions that can
address this misalignment between economic policy pertaining to
tobacco and commitments to implement the provisions of the FCTC.
The arguments used by our key informants in favor of bolstering
tobacco manufacturing through government investment incentives
suggests that discourse in the economic sector is largely influenced by
the standard arguments (e.g. job loss/gain, revenue generation,
personal choice) perpetuated by the tobacco industry over the years,
particularly in tobacco growing countries.36,37 Studies like this one
provide important information to sensitize tobacco control proponents
to the perspectives and approaches being fostered outside of the
health sector. This sensitization is particularly important as countries
begin to implement intersectoral coordinating mechanisms for FCTC
implementation as per Article 5.2. It is recognized that the political
economic context must be confronted and engaged with by tobacco
control proponents for any lasting success in tobacco control policy to
be made.2,38–40
At a more abstract level, this study suggests a need to establish
and integrate norms pertaining to the economics of tobacco and
tobacco control. Our interviews revealed that the logic employed within
the economic sector, that tobacco is a viable and sustainable economic
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commodity, still persists despite numerous studies to the contrary.41–43
The argument that tobacco is an export commodity and therefore not
linked to the health of the population within the country is contrary to
the intent of the FCTC to reduce tobacco consumption worldwide (and
not simply in any given country). Without comprehensive tobacco
control measures in place it is predicted that consumption among
Zambians will increase.27,44–47 It is reported that RITCO is in discussion
with Japan Tobacco Incorporated (JTI) to produce JTI brands for the
Zambian market.22 RITCO itself has indicated that they will be
developing new brands to be sold in the domestic market. The
proliferation of tobacco products without the protection of
comprehensive tobacco control measures will likely lead to dramatic
increases in consumption.
Government investment incentives that support tobacco
industry development are deeply problematic for FCTC
implementation. This finding in Zambia’s case, which we speculate is
likely repeated in most other low-income tobacco-producing countries
that are also Parties to the FCTC, points to an urgent need to foster
whole-of-government FCTC implementation.

What This Paper Adds








Successful implementation of the WHO Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) will require whole-of-government
(WoG) engagement.
There continues to exist gross misalignments between the
economic policies of tobacco producing countries like Zambia,
who are providing investment incentives to support tobacco
industry activity, and commitments made to implement the
provisions of the FCTC.
Providing investment incentives to stimulate tobacco processing
and manufacturing is contrary to Article 5.3 of the FCTC and is a
crucial component to be addressed by tobacco control
proponents to reduce the supply of tobacco.
Our study provides important insights into the underlying logic
used by officials to justify investment incentives that support
tobacco processing and manufacturing.
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